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I. INTRODUCTION
A series of high profile decisions by the Supreme Court of the United
States, including Burwell v. Hobby Lobby' and Obergefell v. Hodges,2 have
highlighted the potential reach and impact of religious exemptions from
generally applicable laws including the Affordable Care Act and
nondiscrimination provisions protecting lesbian, gay, bisexual, and
transgender (LGBT) people. The recent debate and controversy
surrounding religious exemptions has extended well beyond these
landmark Supreme Court cases. It has reverberated through state
legislatures and governments and has struck a chord with individual
citizens and business owners as the nation struggles to reconcile two core
American values-religious liberty and individual civil rights.3 Although
recent judicial action has brought this intersection into the homes of many
Americans for the first time, the quest to balance these potentially
competing rights is not new. The federal government has long been tasked
with translating judicial decisions and aspirational values into practical
policies. Although these administrative actions rarely garner the same
1. See generally 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
2. See generally 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
3. See, e.g., Religious Freedom and Restoration Act of 2015, IND. CODE ANN. §
34-13-9-8 (West 2015) (providing the Indiana state government may not substantially
burden a sincerely held religious belief unless there is a compelling government interest
and the action is the least restrictive means in achieving that interest); see also Elane
Photography, LLC v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53, 77 (N.M. 2013) (holding a photography
company discriminated against a customer on the basis of sexual orientation in
violation of the New Mexico Human Rights Act when it refused to photograph a same-
sex commitment ceremony); see also ABC News, RFRA: Michigan Business Wouldn't
Cater a Gay Wedding, ABC NEWS (Apr. 1, 2015, 7:37 AM) (reporting a local Indiana
pizza shop, if asked, would refuse to cater a same-sex wedding because it conflicted
with their religious beliefs).
2
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attention or ire as judicial action, the consequences of misconceived federal
policies have sweeping repercussions on society at large.
In June 2007, the Department of Justice's Office of Legal Counsel
(OLC) published a memorandum ("the OLC memo") addressing the
prohibition of discrimination on the grounds of an individual employee's
religion in the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 2002
(JJDPA).4 The OLC issued this memorandum in response to a claim by a
religiously-affiliated aid organization that the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA)5 should exempt the organization from
complying with the general nondiscrimination provision in the JJDPA.6 In
its memorandum, the OLC addressed the prohibition of discrimination on
the grounds of an individual employee's religion in the JJDPA. In writing
this memo, the Justice Department heavily relied on the 2006 Supreme
Court decision, Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do
Vegetal. Applying a narrow and highly deferential interpretation of 0
Centro, the Justice Department built the foundation of the OLC memo on
untested ground. Almost a decade later, the legal understanding regarding
RFRA and the development of precedent interpreting 0 Centro has
changed dramatically. The Justice Department's overly expansive
interpretation of RFRA fails to balance the potential burden on religious
employers with the government's compelling interest to prevent
discrimination, particularly by federally funded employers. By failing to
fully address the compelling government interest, the OLC memo
continues to offer religious organizations a blank check to discriminate
against prospective employees on the basis of religion without judicial or
statutory support.
Although the OLC memo was drafted in response to a discrete inquiry,
the federal government has applied this memo broadly as binding policy to
other federal grant programs. Specifically, in 2014, the Justice Department
issued guidance implementing the Violence Against Women
Reauthorization Act of 2013 (VAWA), addressing the nondiscrimination
4. See U.S. Dep't. of Justice, Opinion Letter on Application of the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act to the Award of a Grant Pursuant to the Juvenile Justice and
Delinquency Prevention Act (June 29, 2007), as reprinted in O.L.C. at WL 5633562
[hereinafter "OLC Memo"]; 42 U.S.C. § 3789d (c)(1) (2000); see also Juvenile Justice
and Delinquency Act of 2002, 42 U.S.C. § 5601 (2002) (explaining that "as a condition
of receiving grants pursuant to the JJDPA, recipients must refrain from discriminating
on the basis of religion in 'employment in connection with any programs or activity'
funded by the grant").
5. See Religious Freedom and Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1
(1993).
6. See OLC Memo, supra note 4, at 1.
7. See generally, 546 U.S. 418 (2006).
20161
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provisions of the Act to religiously affiliated grantees.8 The Department's
guidance directly referenced the OLC memo, providing that religious
organizations receiving federal VAWA funding could "prefer co-
religionists for employees in programs by covered grants."9 This guidance
follows the reasoning of the OLC memo and requires religious
organizations to meet certain, subjective criteria including that the
organization determines that the nondiscrimination provision would
substantially burden its religion.
This article addresses concerns with a 2007 Department of Justice legal
interpretation regarding the reach of a statutory nondiscrimination
provision in the context of faith-based organizations that receive federal
funds. It argues that the Justice Department not only failed to appropriately
apply 2007 legal standards to the memo, but that the law has evolved even
further from the Department's reasoning. As a result, we urge the
Department to formally rescind this memo and to refrain from continuing
to apply this policy going forward.
Part II addresses the passage of RFRA, and traces the development of the
"compelling government interest" test under the statute and its role in
determining whether government action is appropriate. Part III provides an
overview of the OLC memo. Further, Part III analyzes the OLC memo's
application of the RFRA balancing test in context of 0 Centro. Part IV
argues that, given the recent developments in case law concerning 0
Centro and Hobby Lobby v. Burwell, the Justice Department should
formally rescind the OLC memo.
II. RFRA: BACKGROUND, PASSAGE, AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO
CIVIL RIGHTS
A. Birth of the "Religious Freedom Restoration Act"
In Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v.
Smith,10 Respondents Alfred Smith and Galen Black, practitioners of a
Native American faith, were terminated from their employment as a result
of their sacramental use of peyote." Upon termination, Respondents were
denied unemployment benefits due to the State's categorization of peyote
use as work "misconduct."1 2 Respondents then brought suit alleging that
8. See Nondiscrimination Grant Condition in the Violence Against Women
Reauthorization Act of 2013, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE (Apr. 9, 2014),
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/ovw/egacy/20 14/ 6/20/faqs-ngc-vawa.pdf.
9. See id. at 4.
10. See generally 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
11. See id. at 874.
12. See id.
4
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the State's denial of unemployment benefits violated their First
Amendment rights to freedom of expression and religion.' 3 Finding for the
State, the Court held that an individual's right to free exercise of religion
does not supersede the individual's obligation to comply with "valid and
neutral laws of general applicability.'
14
The decision in Smith sent shockwaves throughout Congress. Both
Democrats and Republicans condemned the Court's holding, claiming it
departed from controlling free exercise law. Public outcry following the
Smith decision culminated into the passage of the Religious Freedom and
Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA), a law designed to codify the strict
scrutiny test, in particular the "compelling interest" prong, for cases
involving the free exercise clause as established by the Court in Sherbert v.
Verner. 15
Similar to the facts of Smith but with a diametrically opposed holding,
Sherbert involved a member of the Seventh Day Adventists who was fired
from her job because she was unable to work on Saturdays for religious
reasons.' 6 When she sought unemployment benefits, the South Carolina
Employment Security Commission denied her application because the
Commission viewed her religious reason for declining work, that Saturday
was her Sabbath day, as unjustified.17 The Court rejected the notion that a
"showing merely of a rational relationship to some colorable state interest
would suffice"' 8 and instead adopted a compelling government interest
requirement for actions that result in a "substantial infringement of
religious liberties."' 9 Thus, the Court found in Sherbert's favor because
South Carolina's stated interest in preventing fraudulent claims was not
backed by evidence; the state did not show that such a problem would be
created if it accommodated an alternate Sabbath day.2°
Believing that Smith should have been decided along the same lines
as Sherbert, Congressman Stephen Solarz introduced the first version of the
Religious Freedom and Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA) only months after
the Court released its decision in Smith.2' The 1993 version that would
13. See id.
14. See id. at 879.
15. See generally 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
16. See id. at 399.
17. Id. at 401.
18. Id. at 406.
19. Id. at 407.
20. Id. at 408-409.
21. See Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1990, H.R. 5377, 101st Cong. §§ 1-
2 (1990) (sponsored by Rep. Stephen J. Solarz (D-NY-13)).
2016] 449
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become law was introduced concurrently by then Congressman Charles
Schumer in the House of Representatives and Senator Edward Kennedy in
the Senate with near universal support.22 Garnering endorsements from
major religious and civil liberty organizations23 and President Clinton,24 the
bill passed on a voice vote in the House and with only three dissenters in
the Senate.2 5
RFRA prohibits the federal government from "substantially burden[ing]"
a person's religious exercise unless doing so is the least restrictive means
of furthering a compelling governmental interest.26  Mirroring the
balancing test the Court established in Sherbert, the law creates a uniform
standard for evaluating all claims of government interference into religious
exercise. However, it is a one-size-fits-all test that does not adequately
reflect the nuance applied to free exercise jurisprudence between Sherbert
and Smith.
B. Free Exercise Clause Jurisprudence
The 1940s marked the modem era of free exercise clause jurisprudence
in which the Court recognized that the First Amendment guarantees
protection for at least some religiously motivated actions.27 Cantwell v.
22. See Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, S.578, 103rd Cong. (1993)
(sponsored by Sen. Edward M. Kennedy (D-MA)); see also Religious Freedom
Restoration Act of 1993, H.R. 1308, 103rd Cong. (1993) (sponsored by Rep. Charles E.
Schumer (D-NY-9)).
23. See, e.g., ACLU, ACLU Strongly Supports Religious Freedom Restoration
Act; Urges Congress to Act Quickly to Restore Protections, OGDEN ON POLITICS (Mar.
11, 1993), http://www.ogdenonpolitics.com/2015/03/press-release-aclu-strongly-
supports.html; see also Baptist Joint Committee for Religious Liberty, The Religious
Freedom Restoration Act: 20 Years of Protecting Our First Freedom (2013),
http://bjconline.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/RFRA-Book-FNAL.pdf. (listing
other supporting organizations).
24. See U.S. Gov't Pub. Off., Remarks on Signing the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act of 1993, ADMINISTRATION OF WILLIAM J. CLINTON (Nov. 16, 1993),
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/WCPD-1993-11-22/pdf/WCPD-1993-11-22-
Pg2377.pdf. President Clinton stated, "What this law basically says is that the
Government should be held to a very high level of proof before it interferes with
someone's free exercise of religion. This judgment is shared by the people of the
United States as well as by the Congress."
25. See Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb- (1993)
(Sen. Robert Byrd (D-WV), Sen. Jesse Helms (R-NC), Sen. Harlan Mathews (D-TN)
voted nay).
26. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1.
27. See, e.g., Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 116-17 (1943) (holding a
Pennsylvania ordinance requiring members of Jehovah's Witness purchase a solicitor's
license before canvassing door-to-door, violated the free exercise clause of the First
Amendment); see also W. Va. Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943)
6
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Connecticu 8 marked a significant shift away from the steadfast divide
between belief and action established in Reynolds v. United States.29 In
rejecting a state law that required individuals to seek a license to solicit
religious or charitable donations, the Court determined that "[t]he essential
characteristic of these liberties is that, under their shield, many types of life,
character, opinion and belief can develop unmolested and unobstructed."30
Simultaneously, the Court clarified that there must be limits on actions, for
"[c]onduct remains subject to regulation for the protection of society.31
Sherbert and the subsequent Court decision in Wisconsin v. Yoder32 set
the high-water mark for cases giving deference to religious exercise.
Between Sherbert (1963) and Smith (1990), the Court heard seventeen
cases involving free exercise claims and ultimately rejected thirteen of
those claims.33 Three of the four claims in which the Court affirmed the
strict scrutiny standard and found in favor of the plaintiffs were
unemployment benefits cases directly on point with Sherbert.34
Starting in the mid-1980s, the Court carved out exemptions to the strict
scrutiny standard set forth in Sherbert. Deference was routinely given to
(holding the West Virginia Board of Education's policy compelling students to salute
the American flag violated the free exercise clause of the first amendment).
28. See generally, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940) (holding that a state law that required
a license to ask for religious and charitable donations was unconstitutional).
29. See 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
30. See Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 310.
31. Seeid. at304.
32. See 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
33. See Frazee v. 11. Dep't of Emp't, 489 U.S. 829, 834-35 (1989); see also Lyng
v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 450-53 (1988); Hobbie v.
Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136, 146 (1987); Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S.
693, 712 (1986); Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 509-10 (1986); Tony & Susan
Alamo Found.v. Sec'y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 306 (1985); Wayte v. United States,
470 U.S. 598, 614 (1985); Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 605 (1983);
United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 260-61 (1982); Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind.
Emp't Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 719-20 (1981); Trans World Airlines v. Hardison, 432
U.S. 63, 84-85 (1977); Johnson v. Robinson, 415 U.S. 361, 385-86 (1974); United
States v. Am. Friends Serv. Comm., 419 U.S. 7, 11-12 (1974); Wisconsin v. Yoder,
406 U.S. 205, 234-36 (1972); Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 461-63 (1971);
Bd. of Educ. of Cent. Sch. Dist. No. I v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 248-49 (1968); United
States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 187-88 (1965).
34. See Frazee, 489 U.S. at 830-31 (finding that a Christian is denied
unemployment benefits because he declined a temporary job which would have
required him to work on Sundays); see also Hobbie, 480 U.S. at 138 (1987); see also
Thomas, 450 U.S. at 710 (finding that a Jehovah's Witness is denied unemployment
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the government's management of its own affairs. The Court was
increasingly disinclined to question a wide range of government actions
from military and prison regulations to land use claims and application of
welfare benefits, though most of the decisions were far from unanimous.35
Though not all of the case outcomes would have necessarily changed if
strict scrutiny had been applied, the precedent would have been different
going into Smith.
Rather than being a surprising break from Sherbert, Smith was the
culmination of a trajectory away from a strict scrutiny test for free exercise
claims. Troublingly, the trend towards denying free exercise claims
involved placing the ease of government regulation above the needs of
36 ~ hreligious minorities. With the passage of RFRA, Congress contemplated
the effects of the new standard outlined in Smith on individuals who are
underrepresented in government decision-making and thus more likely to
have their religious exercise burdened without careful consideration.
C. Original Purpose of RFRA
Too often, legislation and governmental policies are adopted without
sufficient consideration for their potential impact on religious minorities.
This is largely due to the fact that congressional and legislative bodies are
rarely representative of the rich cultural and religious diversity within the
communities they represent. For instance, of the current Congressional
members, 92 percent are Christian.37 The first Muslim was elected to
Congress in 2007, the first Hindu in 2012, and the first Buddhist in 2013.38
RFRA came to fruition in large part due to concern regarding the lack of
protection for the rights of religious minorities. Contemporaneous with the
35. See Lyng, 485 U.S. at 441, 453 (1988) (5-3 decision) (deference given to
government land use plans resulting in destruction of a Native American religious
ceremony grounds); see also O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 343, 350-51
(1987) (5-4 decision) (deference given to prison regulations that required Muslim
plaintiffs to work jobs that interfered with prayer services); Bowen, 476 U.S. at 694,
710-12 (8-1 decision) (deference given to government with regards to welfare program
requirement that participants must use a social security number requiring a Native
American parent to utilize a number for his daughter in conflict with his religious
beliefs); Goldman v. Weinberg, 475 U.S. at 503, 509-10 (5-4 decision) (deference
given to military regulations that inhibited an orthodox Jew serving as a clinical
psychologist from wearing a yarmulke).
36. See Lyng, 485 U.S. at 422; see also O'Lone, 482 U.S. at 343; see also Bowen,
476 U.S. at 711-12; see also Goldman, 475 U.S. at 505.
37. See Faith on the Hill: The Religious Composition of the 114th Congress, PEW
REs. CENT. (Jan. 5, 2015), http://www.pewforum.org/2015/01/05/faith-on-the-hillV.
38. See id (identifying Rep. Keith Ellison (D-Minn.), Sen. Mazie K. Hirono (D-
Haw.), Rep. Tulsi Gabbard (D-Haw.).
8
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passage of RFRA, the Senate issued an accompanying report, highlighting
that "[s]tate and local legislative bodies cannot be relied upon to craft
exceptions from laws of general application to protect the ability of the
religious minorities to practice their faiths, an explicit fundamental
constitutional right."'3 9
In 1993, the year that RFRA passed, the Senate heard testimony from a
wide variety of voices focused on the concern that neutral laws could result
in harm to religious minorities. For example, Senator Orrin Hatch
expressed trepidation that the Smith decision could result in a Jewish public
school student being required to remove his yarmulke.4 ° Statements were
delivered by a member of the Hmong community as well as a member the
Mormon community,41 and the Baptist Joint Committee for Religious
Liberty jointly testified on behalf of the American Jewish Committee.42
Testimony from Professor Douglas Laycock centered on the experiences of
Americans who practice African religions, Catholicism, Mormonism, and
Jehovah's Witnesses.4 3 Elder Dallin Oaks, a member of the Quorum of the
Twelve Apostles of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints,
captured the sentiment of the day by explaining that "[b]y their nature,
elected officials are unlikely to pass ordinances, statutes or laws that
interfere with large, mainstream religions whose adherents possess
significant political power at the ballot box. But political power or impact
must not be the measure of which religious practices can be forbidden by
law."44
39. See JOSEPH BIDEN, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM RESTORATION ACT OF 1993, S. REP.
No. 103-111, at8 (1993).
40. See The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: Hearing on S. 2969 Before the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong. 7 (1992).
41. Id. at 14-26 (prepared statement by William Nouyi Yang); 30-32 (Dallin H.
Oaks, Quorum of the Twelve Apostles, Church of Jesus Christ and Latter-Day Saints,
Salt Lake City, Utah).
42. Id. at 41-43 (Oliver S. Thomas, Baptist Joint Committee for Religious
Liberty).
43. See id at 63-65 (finding that although Catholics are generally considered part
of the broader fabric of Christianity today, there has been a long history of
discrimination against Catholics in the United States). See, e.g., H.R. Res. 1, 43d
Cong., 4 CONG. REC. 5453 (1876) (amending the U.S. Constitution prohibiting federal
funds from going to parochial schools, specifically targeting Catholic schools).
44. See The Religious Freedom Restoration Act. Hearing on S. 2969 Before the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong. 38 (1992) (Dallin H. Oaks, Quorum of the
Twelve Apostles, Church of Jesus Christ and Latter-Day Saints, Salt Lake City, Utah).
2016]
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III. PUBLICATION OF THE 2007 OLC WORLD VISION MEMO AND 0
CENTRO DE VEGETAL
After receiving a federal Department of Justice grant to run an outreach
program for at-risk youth, World Vision requested an exemption from the
general nondiscrimination provision in the Juvenile Justice and
Delinquency Prevention Act of 2002 (JJDPA). This nondiscrimination
provision provides that:
No person in any State shall on the ground of race, color, religion,
national origin, or sex be excluded from participation in, be denied the
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under or denied
employment in connection with any programs or activity funded in
whole or in part with funds made available under this chapter.
45
Unlike Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,46 which permits
religious organizations to limit employment to members of a certain faith
or to give preference in hiring to member of the faith, the JJDPA
nondiscrimination provision provides no special accommodations for
religious organizations.47
World Vision, a faith-based organization, maintained a policy of hiring
only Christian staff members and argued that this hiring policy was
necessary to continue their charitable mission.48  In response, the
Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) published a memo
addressing the reach of the JJDPA statutory nondiscrimination provision in
the context of faith-based organizations that receive federal funds.49
Specifically, the memo addresses the prohibition of discrimination on the
grounds of an individual employee's religious affiliation pursuant to the
JJDPA.50  OLC determined that to require World Vision to hire non-
Christian staff would impose a substantial burden on the organization's
right to free exercise of religion and would, therefore, violate RFRA. 51 The
memo states that prohibiting religious organizations from hiring only co-
religionists would "impose a significant burden on their exercise of
religion, even as applied to employees in programs that must, by law,
45. See 42 U.S.C. § 3789d(c)(1) (2002).
46. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2014).
47. See 42 U.S.C. § 3789d(c)(1).
48. See WORLD VISION, Job Opportunities: Who We Are,
http://www.worldvision.org/about-us/job-opportunities/who-we-are (last visited on
Mar. 15, 2016) (highlighting a preference for Christian staff, stating "our Christian
faith is a uniting factor among staff').
49. See OLC Memo, supra note 4.
50. See id.
51. See id. at l8.
10
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refrain from specifically religious activities.52 Under the terms of the
grant, World Vision was obligated to provide services such as mentoring,
job training, and academic tutoring to at-risk youth regardless of their
religious affiliation.53
A. The OLC Memo's Failure to Fully Engage the RFRA Balancing Test
RFRA specifically provides that "governments should not substantially
burden religious exercise without compelling justification.,54  Further,
RFRA states that, "the compelling interest test set forth in prior federal
court rulings is a workable test for striking sensible balances between
religious liberty and competing prior governmental interests.5 5 Although
the OLC memo undertakes a lengthy analysis as to whether conditioning
receipt of JJDPA funded grants on compliance with the general
nondiscrimination provision would "substantially burden" World Vision's
exercise of religion, the memo neglects to provide an equally robust
analysis of the well-established governmental interest in eradicating
discrimination in employment and therefore fails to strike the "sensible
balance" mandated by RFRA.56 The OLC memo blatantly dismisses the
compelling interest test and fails to adequately engage the well-established
compelling government interest in ending employment discrimination.
Although the Justice Department itself cites case law that clearly places the
burden for proving this interest squarely on the shoulders of the
government, the federal government in the OLC memo offers a mere three
page discussion of this critical analysis.57
The OLC memo relies on the standard of review refined by Gonzales v.
0 Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal58 - a Supreme Court case
that elevated RFRA's "to the person" standard for determining whether the
government has a compelling interest that outweighs a religious burden to
the Controlled Substances Act.59 However, the memo fails to adequately
apply this standard of review to the World Vision exemption request.
Rather, the memo offers only two main points to dismiss the government's
compelling interest: (1) given that many statutes exempt religious
organizations from prohibitions on religious discrimination in employment,
52. See id. at 9.
53. Id. at 2.
54. See Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2015).
55. See id.; see also OLC Memo, supra note 4.
56. See OLC Memo, supra note 4.
57. Id. at 20-23.
58. 546 U.S. 418 (2006).
59. See id. at 430-32.
2016]
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including Title VII, enforcing the provision in the JJDPA would not further
a compelling government interest; and (2) World Vision's lack of animus
towards non-Christians lessens the government's compelling interest in
enforcing nondiscrimination protections.60 The Department summarily
dismisses the government's compelling interest to eradicate employment
discrimination, and further dismisses the final RFRA analysis as to whether
denial of the exemption is the least restrictive means to further the
government's purpose.
B. "Selective" Enforcement is Still Enforcement
Citing the Bush-era Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services
Administration (SAMSHA) Charitable Choice regulations,61 the OLC
memo states that Congress's "selective" application of religious
nondiscrimination requirements in the employment context calls into
question the government's compelling interest in enforcing employment
nondiscrimination provisions.62 The OLC memo erroneously construes the
adoption of exemptions, specifically in Title VII, as a dismissal of the
government's interest in enforcing these provisions against employers.
63
The OLC memo mischaracterizes the Title VII religious exemptions and
wrongly applies them to the JJDPA and other federal grant programs.
Although federal district and circuit courts have liberally construed both
the Title VII religious exemptions and the scope of the First Amendment's
Free Exercise Clause in favor of religious employers,64 they are far from
the blank check that the OLC memo contends.65
60. See OLC Memo, supra note 4.
61. See 42 C.F.R. § 54 (2015).
62. See OLC Memo, supra note 4.
63. Id.
64. See, e.g., Corp. of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day
Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 331 (1987); Killinger v. Samford Univ., 113 F.3d 196,
197 (1 1th Cir. 1997); Little v. Wuerl, 929 F.2d 944, 945 (3d Cir. 1991); Ganzy v. Allen
Christian Sch., 995 F. Supp. 340, 344 (E.D.N.Y. 1998); EEOC v. Presbyterian
Ministries, 788 F. Supp. 1154, 1155-56 (W.D. Wash. 1992); Feldstein v. Christian
Science Monitor, 555 F. Supp. 974, 975 (D. Mass. 1983); Young v. Shawnee Mission
Med. Ctr., No. 88-2321-S, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12248, at *1 (D. Ks. 1988).
65. See OLC Memo, supra note 4. The ministerial exception, grounded in the
Religious Clauses under the First Amendment, grants religious institutions control over
employment practices without fear of court intrusion. See also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1
(2014); Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694
(2012). This exception precludes application of employment nondiscrimination laws,
such as Title VII, when an employee's role is religious in nature. This constitutional
exemption differs from Section 702 of Title VII, the statute's co-religionist exemption
that allows for religious institutions, as employers, to prefer co-religionists.
12
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More broadly, the exemptions cited by the OLC memorandum do not
swallow the rule. The government maintains a strong compelling interest
in ending discrimination in employment. While these exemptions
recognize that, in some instances, religious employers should be allowed to
discriminate on the basis of religion in hiring, they do not moot entire
provisions. Based on the strong case law supporting this compelling
government interest, the OLC memorandum's argument that the
government has no interest in ending discrimination by religious employers
is disingenuous at best. Although the 0 Centro Court asserts a similar
impact of statutory exemptions on determinations of compelling interest,
subsequent cases, including Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, do not adopt this
assumption.
66
C. Lack ofAnimus is Inconsequential in Determining a Substantial Burden
or a Compelling Interest
The OLC memo asserts that World Vision's lack of animus and lengthy
history of hiring only co-religionists makes its request for an exemption
less harmful to non-Christians or neutralizes the government's interest in
preventing such discrimination.67 The memo goes on to provide that if a
religious employer requested an exemption based on animus, then the
government may have a compelling interest in enforcing the exemption.68
Unlike the rest of the opinion, this section lacks citation or case law
support. The mindset or drive behind discriminatory behavior is not taken
into account when enforcing federal nondiscrimination provisions. The
impact of these exemptions on the parties discriminated against is the
same-regardless of motive. Therefore, the discussion of animus to
dismiss a compelling government interest is both unsupported and
historically ignorant.
D. Misapplication of 0 Centro to World Vision's Exemption Request
The Justice Department bolsters its blanket dismissal of the
government's compelling interest in enforcing the nondiscrimination
provision in the JJDPA by broadly interpreting Gonzales v. 0 Centro
Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal. The Court in 0 Centro determined
that a general interest in preventing drug abuse was not enough to justify
denial of an exemption from the Controlled Substances Act for sacramental
69consumption of hoasca-a Schedule I hallucinogen. The Justice
66. See Ira C. Lupu, Hobby Lobby and the Dubious Enterprise of Religious
Exemptions, 38 HARV. J. L. & GENDER 35, 64-65 (2015)
67. See OLC Memo, supra note 4.
68. See id.
69. See Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S.
2016]
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Department cites the 0 Centro Court's conclusion stating, "RFRA requires
the Government to demonstrate that the compelling interest test is satisfied
through application of the challenged law 'to the person'-the particular
claimant whose sincere exercise of religion is being substantially
burdened., 70  In granting the World Vision exemption, the Justice
Department engaged in a near myopic reliance on the 0 Centro decision.
However, at the time the OLC memo was published, 0 Centro had not
been cited by any other court-giving the Justice Department
unprecedented flexibility in its application.
The 0 Centro test requires a very fact-specific analysis of the
complainant and the government action.71  However, World Vision's
request and the impact of its exemption are very distinct from the fact
pattern in 0 Centro and subsequent cases discussed below. It is clear that,
despite the Justice Department's confident reliance on this case, the OLC
memo fails to adequately apply the focused strict scrutiny test it requires.
Applying the "to the person" standard to the church in 0 Centro, the
Supreme Court determined that preventing access to hoasca to the 130-
member church did not further the government's compelling interest to
stop the war on drugs.72 In 0 Centro, the exemption was from compliance
with a law that had broad public health and safety ramifications.73 There
was no clear third party-beyond the general public-that would be
harmed or impacted by granting an exemption. World Vision's request to
be exempt from a general nondiscrimination provision as a grantee is far
from analogous to this case.
Unlike the Controlled Substances Act at question in 0 Centro, the
nondiscrimination provision in the JJDPA is designed to explicitly protect
the rights of individuals from real, immediate harm. Unlike the 130-person
church in 0 Centro, World Vision is an organization that receives millions
of dollars in federal funding and has a budget of almost $1 billion
annually.74 In 2012 alone, World Vision employed over 1,300 workers and
418,439 (2006).
70. See OLC Memo, supra note 4 (quoting 0 Centro, 546 U.S. at 429-30) (citing
42 U.S.C. § 20001(b)).
71. See Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 431 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment) (stating
that strict scrutiny "at least requires a case-by-case determination of the question,
sensitive to the facts of each particular claim").
72. See id. at 438.
73. See id.
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87,923 volunteers.75  The 2007 exemption deprives each of these
employees of their civil rights protections under federal law and will
continue to impact thousands of future employees. Unlike the use of
sacramental hoasca by a small church population, the burden, the
exemption, and the impact of the OLC memo are not discrete. Therefore, a
genuine application of the "to the person" standard to World Vision's
request should ultimately result in the denial of an exemption.
While 0 Centro requires the government to prove a compelling interest
beyond promoting uniformity or a categorical good, Chief Justice Roberts
does not dismiss the notion that the categorical standard could still be used
in some cases.76 He writes that, "there may be instances where a need for
uniformity precludes the recognition of exceptions to generally applicable
laws under RFRA.' ' 7 7 Although the "to the person" standard should apply
to World Vision, we also argue that the World Vision case-and
nondiscrimination provisions binding federal grantees generally-should
fall under the category of instances where the need for uniformity requires
generally applicable laws to be enforced in spite of RFRA. The impact of
exemptions from federal nondiscrimination protections goes beyond the
complainant and impacts the very populations Congress intended to
protect. Given the scope of these laws, and the potential far-reaching harm
of the exemptions, the government maintains a compelling interest in
eradicating employment discrimination by federal grantees despite the
burden it may place on a grantee's religious exercise.
IV. A REVIEW OF 0 CENTRO A DECADE LATER AND THE IMPACT
OF BURWELL v. HOBBYLOBBY
When decided in 2006, 0 Centro had the potential to be a forceful
change agent, reinforcing the promised vigor of RFRA. This potential was
undoubtedly reflected by the Bush administration's interpretation and
application to the World Vision exemption request. However, over the past
decade, the 0 Centro potential for providing additional plaintiff protection
has fallen far short of this expectation. The Court's strong plaintiff
decision in 0 Centro has become an anomalous outlier in RFRA case law,
and as a result, so has the reasoning behind the OLC memo. The 2014
decision in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby provided a similarly aggressive
restatement supporting RFRA implementation, but in practice, scholars
speculate that the impact of the decision, particularly on nondiscrimination
75. See id.
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provisions, will be similarly weak.7 8
A. 0 Centro at 10
The Court in 0 Centro provided a strong pro-religious liberty
interpretation of RFRA, finding that the need for uniformity does not
amount to a compelling interest, but rather, the government must meet the
"to the person" standard.79 The Court also determined that the existence of
other exemptions within the statutory regime in question undermines any
government argument of a compelling interest.80 Echoes of both of these
points reverberate in the OLC memo as previously discussed. However,
such staunch reliance on a nascent and untested standard has proven to be a
fatal flaw in the OLC memo. To put it bluntly, it has not aged well. As has
been the case in the recent history of RFRA case law development, lower
courts have been timid to apply the new, vigorously pro-plaintiff 0 Centro
decision.8' As a result, over the past decade case law has shifted
progressively further and further from the strong reformative call to
plaintiff protection established in 0 Centro.
Appeals courts have clung to a pre-O Centro standard of review,
refusing to apply an altered methodology for weighing compelling interest
following that decision.82 For the purposes of this Article, we will focus
most acutely on decisions in which courts have retained the categorical
approach to weighing compelling government interest dismissed by the 0
Centro Court. For example, in United States v. Vasquez-Ramos, the
Second Circuit concluded that a religious objector did not have a valid
RFRA claim to avoid paying a portion of taxes to the U.S. Department of
Defense.83 The court relied on pre-O Centro case law concluding that
"voluntary compliance is the least restrictive means by which the Internal
Revenue Service (IRS) furthers the compelling governmental interest in
uniform, mandatory participation in the federal income tax system."84 In
another case, the Ninth Circuit denied a plaintiff's reliance on the 0 Centro
standard outright, providing that, although "defendants argue that the
Supreme Court's decision in [0 Centro] constitutes a significant shift in the
78. See, e.g., Lupu, supra note 66, at 64.
79. See Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 430-31.
80. See id. at 433.
81. See, e.g., Olsen v. Mukasey, 541 F.3d 827, 832-33 (8th Cir. 2008); United
States v. Vasquez-Ramos, 531 F.3d 987, 990-91 (9th Cir. 2008); Jenkins v. Comm'r of
Internal Revenue, 483 F.3d 90, 92 (2d Cir. 2007).
82. See, e.g., Mukasey, 541 F.3d at 832-33; Vasquez-Ramos, 531 F.3d at 990-91;
Jenkins, 483 F.3d at 92.
83. See Vasquez-Ramos, 531 F.3d at 992.
84. See Browne v. United States, 176 F.3d 25, 26 (2d Cir. 1999).
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legal terrain surrounding the appropriate application of... RFRA.... [the
court] disagree[s].' '85
In fact, only four plaintiffs raising RFRA claims outside of the prison
context have been successful.86 These cases are easily distinguishable from
the World Vision claim, including a case87 with a significantly similar
factual claim to the Church in 0 Centro and a second case in which the
government lacked evidence to support its restriction.88 Most recently, in
the prison case Holt v. Hobbs,89 the Supreme Court determined that a
federal inmate should be allowed to keep a beard longer than the traditional
protocol for religious reasons.90 The Court determined that in this instance
a single prisoner should not bear the brunt of the compelling government
interest to keep contraband out of prisons nationwide.91  The Court
concluded that removal of the beard was far from the least restrictive
means available to further the government's interest, suggesting that
available alternatives could include combing or routine examination by
guards.92 While these five cases are deferential to the 0 Centro decision
and apply a faithful implementation of the standards it represents, as
Professor Ira C. Lupu aptly concluded in 2015, the majority of courts
analyzing RFRA claims prior to Burwell v. Hobby Lobby have decided in
favor of the government, dismissing the 0 Centro decision's purported
shift nearly completely.
93
B. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby and Religious Exemptions from
Nondiscrimination Provisions
Many articles preceding this piece have provided extensive analysis and
dissection of Hobby Lobby and its dangerous impact on access to
contraceptives and reproductive health care. This Article refrains from
directly addressing questions as to the strength or accuracy of the Hobby
Lobby decision, -and instead focuses on the impact of the decision on the
2007 World Vision memo and more broadly places it in context of
nondiscrimination provisions.
85. See Vasquez-Ramos, 531 F.3d at 992.
86. See Lupu, supra note 66; Matthew Nicholson, Note, Is 0 Centro a Sign of
Hopefor RFRA Claimants?, 95 VA. L. REv. 1281, 1285-87 (2009).
87. See Church of the Holy Light of the Queen v. Holder, 443 Fed. Appx. 302 (9th
Cir. 2011).
88. See Potter v. District of Columbia, 558 F.3d 542 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
89. 135 S. Ct. 853 (2015).
90. See id. at 862.
91. See id. at 864.
92. See id.
93. See Lupu, supra note 66, at 64-65.
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In Hobby Lobby, the Supreme Court considered whether the U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services' (HIHS) contraceptive mandate
substantially burdened the sincerely held religious beliefs of a for-profit
corporation, Hobby Lobby, Inc.94 To answer this question, the Court first
determined that a "person" under RFRA includes for-profit corporations.
Thus, its protections would be afforded to Hobby Lobby, Inc.95 The Court
ultimately held that the HHS contraceptive mandate, requiring that an
employer's group health insurance provide employees with insurance that
covers various methods of contraception, substantially burdened Hobby
Lobby's sincerely held religious beliefs.96
As discussed above, traditional RFRA analysis requires the reviewing
court to consider whether the provision at issue both (1) furthers a
compelling state interest, and (2) is the least restrictive means for furthering
that compelling state interest.97 The Hobby Lobby Court briefly addressed
whether the interests provided by 1{HS (i.e., "public health" and "gender
equality") were sufficient under the "to the person" standard articulated in
0 Centro.98 However, the Hobby Lobby Court, while raising significant
questions as to the government's compelling interest, refrained from
providing a full analysis and instead assumed that the mandate was founded
on a compelling government interest.99 The Court did so despite its own
claim that the given interests failed to meet the 0 Centro standard as well
as Hobby Lobby's position that HHS's interest, under the Affordable Care
Act, does meet the first prong of RFRA.100 Justice Alito, writing for the
majority, concluded that the Court would "assume that the interest in
guaranteeing cost-free methods is compelling within the meaning of
RFRA, and [would] proceed to consider the final prong of the RFRA
test.. 1 The Court then concluded that the government, while having an
interest in ensuring access to contraceptives for women, could employ a
coverage option that would be less restrictive on an employer's religion.
0 2
The Court further concluded that the government itself could provide
universal contraceptive coverage to every woman whose employer denies
94. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2759 (2014).
95. See id. at 2768-69 (citing Gonzales as an example of RFRA protections
extending to non-profit organizations).
96. See id. at 2775-76.
97. See id. at 2779.
98. See id.
99. See id at 2780.
100. See id.
101. See id.
102. See id. at 2781-83.
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her coverage claiming a religious exemption."°3 However politically
impractical this "solution" might have been-including the current absence
of any such policy-it provided the Justices with a practical cover to
uphold the Hobby Lobby decision on RFRA claims while retaining the
government's compelling interest in promoting women's health care.
Going forward, the impact of this decision on women's access to
contraception and full healthcare coverage will undoubtedly be dramatic
and long lasting. However, the reach of this decision beyond
contraception, specifically into the realm of nondiscrimination provisions,
is far less clear and, we argue, less damaging. The Hobby Lobby Court
found in favor of the plaintiff based on this least-restrictive-means prong,
concluding that alternatives existed to further a compelling governmental
interest.1 4  In the context of nondiscrimination provisions, no such
alternative exists--even one as politically impractical as government-
provided universal contraceptive coverage. In fact, Justice Alito
specifically limits the reach of Hobby Lobby to nondiscrimination
provisions, dismissing Justice Ginsburg's dissent, which raises the specter
of invidious discrimination in hiring that is "cloaked as religious practice to
escape legal sanction."10 5  Justice Alito concluded that "[the Court's]
decision.., provides no such shield. The Government has a compelling
interest in providing equal opportunity to participate in the workforce
without regard to race, and prohibitions on racial discrimination are
precisely tailored to achieve that critical goal."' 6 While some have argued
that Justice Alito's remark cannot be used beyond race, we note that Justice
Alito used the words "for example"-language that does not foreclose
transferring this standard to other protected groups, including those who are
LGBT.
The government has a longstanding and well-established interest in
eradicating invidious discrimination. Evidence of this interest has been
bolstered over the past decade by recent federal marriage equality decisions
both at the Supreme Court and multiple federal district and circuit level
courts. 1 7 The adoption of state-level nondiscrimination laws across the
nation in states traditionally reticent to extend protections to LGBT people,
103. See id.
104. See id. at 2782.
105. See id. at 2782-83.
106. See id. at 2782.
107. See generally, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2016); Deboer v.
Snyder, 772 F.3d 388 (6th Cir. 2014); Bourke v. Beshear, 996 F. Supp. 2d 542 (W.D.
Ky. 2014); Love v. Beshear, 989 F. Supp. 2d 536 (W.D. Ky. 2014); Tanco v. Haslam, 7
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including Utah108 and Nevada,0 9 illustrate not only the growing acceptance
of LGBT people, but a shared belief in the government's role to prohibit
discrimination against individuals on the basis of sexual orientation and
gender identity by private businesses and landlords.
The Obama administration has also taken many affirmative steps
towards ending harmful discrimination with federal funds. Executive
Order 11,246, signed by President Obama on July 21, 2014, prohibits
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity in
employment by any federal contractor governed by the Office of Federal
Contract Compliance Programs (OFCCP).'10  Significantly, despite
incredible pressure from religious groups to expand the existing religious
exemption, the Executive Order was left unchanged.1" This section is
identical to the religious exemption found in Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, arguably retaining only limited exemption for religious
employers.
A RFRA claimant challenging a nondiscrimination provision protecting
LGBT people would have to prove that serving, hiring, or housing an
LGBT person or family substantially burdens their religion. Arguably, in
many cases, this proof could be achieved. However, the progress of such a
108. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 34A-5-106 (2015). This law is imperfect. As it merely
adds sexual orientation and gender identity to the list of existing protected
characteristics under Utah law, it does not include protections for public
accommodations. Id. It also includes broad religious exemptions for all protected
characteristics that predated the 2015 revisions. Id.
109. See NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 613.330 (2015) (prohibiting discrimination in
employment on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity); NEV. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 651.070 (2011) (prohibiting discrimination in public accommodations on the
basis of sexual orientation and gender identity); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 118.020
(2011) (prohibiting discrimination in housing on the basis of sexual orientation and
gender identity).
110. See Exec. Order No. 13,672, 79 Fed. Reg. 42,971 (2014) (amending
"[e]xecutive Order 11478. The first sentence of section 1 of Executive Order 11478 of
August 8, 1969, as amended, is revised by substituting "sexual orientation, gender
identity" for "sexual orientation Executive Order 11,246, issued by President Lyndon
B. Johnson, (adding sexual orientation and gender identity to the list of protected
categories in the existing Executive Order covering federal contractors.)").
111. Exec. Order, 11,246, 30 Fed. Reg. 12,319 § 204(c) (1965), reprinted in 42
U.S.C. § 2000e app., at 10,294 (1970).; see 41 C.F.R. § 60-1.5(a)(5) (implementing
that "[s]ection 202 of Executive Order 11,246, as amended, shall not apply to a
Government contractor or subcontractor that is a religious corporation, association,
educational institution, or society, with respect to the employment of individuals of a
particular religion to perform work connected with the carrying on by such corporation,
association, educational institution, or society of its activities. Such contractors and
subcontractors are not exempted or excused from complying with the other
requirements contained in this Order").
20
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claim ends here. Given the clear and compelling interest in ending
discrimination that has continued to develop since publication of the OLC
memo, a RFRA claimant challenging such a provision would have to show
that these laws are not the least restrictive means for furthering this
government interest. In Hobby Lobby, Justice Alito concluded that the
harm to women was not inevitable if the government steps in. 1 2 It was not,
in short, a zero-sum game. Nondiscrimination provisions are. Regardless
of the burden imposed, if the interests are compelling, RFRA only requires
the government to show that the law in question is the least restrictive
means to promote said interest. Therefore the government is left with no
other means to end discrimination against LGBT people, other than
prohibiting discrimination against LGBT people. To decide otherwise
shifts the burden from the RFRA claimant directly to the vulnerable
population, whom these laws were designed to protect, thereby leaving
them with no alternative or recourse.
C. What Does this Mean for the OLC Memo?
Viewing the OLC Memo through a modem lens of both the Hobby
Lobby decision and post-O Centro case law development, it is clear that the
Justice Department's argument, which was questionable in 2007, is now
squarely on the wrong side of today's legal interpretation of religious
liberty and exemption requests. Just as 0 Centro failed to increase
religious liberty protections in 2006, scholars predict that Hobby Lobby will
become similarly ineffectual and anomalous except in cases that bear
dramatic factual similarities.113
The fact pattern underlying World Vision's exemption request is
undoubtedly distinguishable from both 0 Centro and Hobbs,1 4 where the
exemptions granted were from laws aimed at preventing broad, perhaps
even theoretical harms--drug trafficking and access to contraband in
prisons. Applying the "to the person" test to the church in 0 Centro or the
prisoner in Hobbs protects a small pool of individuals' rights from being
restricted for a broad, categorically general good. In both of these
applications of the standard, the exemption was from a law with broad
public health or safety ramifications.1 5 Granting the exemption in either of
these cases does not harm or impact a clear third party. World Vision's
desire to discriminate on the basis of religion is not analogous to the
112. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2782-83 (2014).
113. See Lupu, supra note 66, at 101.
114. See Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S.
418, 432-33 (2006); Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853, 865-67 (2015).
115. SeeHolt, 135 S. Ct. at 859-61.
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individual grooming requirements of an inmate, or the need to access
sacramental drugs of a small congregation. The impact of World Vision's
request for an exemption is far greater than these narrow examples and
should be distinguished from both. Applying the "to the person" standard
required by 0 Centro, we argue that the government retains a compelling
interest in ending incidents of employment discrimination by World Vision
and, given the absence of other alternative means to further this purpose,
the exemption should be denied. Nondiscrimination provisions like those
found in the JJDPA are, in fact, the least restrictive means of achieving a
longstanding and compelling government interest.'
16
Meanwhile, the Hobby Lobby decision further undermines the
Department of Justice's 2007 conclusion that the government lacks a
compelling interest to prohibit religious discrimination by grantees.'7 As
referenced above, the OLC memo dismisses a compelling government
interest in prohibiting discrimination by citing so-called selective
enforcement of nondiscrimination provisions, as well as the weakness of a
uniformity argument.118 However, despite ample opportunity in Hobby
Lobby to undermine the ACA on these grounds, the Court declines to cite
0 Centro in connection with these standards, concluding that despite some
similarities with the 0 Centro case, the government maintains its
compelling interest.119 Finally, the standard set by Hobby Lobby, while
available to RFRA claimants with factually similar claims, cannot be used
to support religious liberty claims against nondiscrimination provisions like
those made by World Vision in 2007. The interests are compelling, and as
elucidated by the Roberts Court, denial of such exemptions is the only
means by which to achieve them.20
V. CONCLUSION
When published in 2007, the OLC's response to World Vision's
exemption request employed an unprecedentedly broad interpretation of
RFRA, relying almost exclusively on a Supreme Court case that was
decided only fourteen months earlier.121  While in June 2007 the
116. See Katherine Franke et al., Memorandum on Law Professors' Analysis of a
Need for Legal Guidance and Policy-Making on Religious Exemptions Raised by
Federal Contractors, Columbia Law Sch. 6 (May 10, 2016),
http://web.law.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/microsites/gender-
sexuality/files/olcmemo analysis fmal.pdf.
117. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2783.
118. See OLC Memo, supra note 4, at 19.
119. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2779-80.
120. Seeid. at2783.
121. See OLC Memo, supra note 4, at 8, 17 (citing 0 Centro, 546 U.S. at 426-32).
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Department of Justice could argue that the 0 Centro case signaled a
strikingly pro-plaintiff shift in religious liberties jurisprudence, today's
Justice Department can make no such claim. Its successors, including Holt
v. Hobbs and Hobby Lobby, do not support the Justice Department's broad
interpretation of RFRA as it applies to nondiscrimination provisions. Ten
years later, 0 Centro is a stark outlier in religious liberty jurisprudence, as
are the policies that cling to it.
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